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Good afternoon. Thank you so much for inviting me to deliver the
Pound Lecture, which is an honor. I am aware of its special place in
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the tradition of the Nebraska Law School, and I know many of the
distinguished professors who have delivered it in the past. I could not
be more delighted to be here. I want to thank your dean in particular
for hosting me.
I. INTRODUCTION
I thought I would talk today about the limits of executive power to
rescind or weaken regulations. It is a particularly interesting time to
think about this topic because we are in a moment of political transi-
tion following the 2016 presidential election.1 We are less than two
months into the new Trump Administration, and it appears that the
new President has very different policies than the prior one. So it is an
opportune time to think about the ways in which presidents make pol-
icy and to discuss the constraints on a new president who wishes to
dramatically reverse course using the variety of instruments at his
disposal. I will add some things about Congress too, because although
Congress may not look especially productive at the moment, there is a
great deal of activity behind the scenes. The most obvious instrument
Congress has to effect policy change is, of course, legislation, but it
also possesses some “superpowers” in the form of the Congressional
Review Act,2 a statute that most people have never heard of but which
I want to discuss because it has special salience during presidential
transitions. My intent today is to give you some understanding of all of
the tools being used at the moment to undo or amend the policies of
the prior Administration.
Now, how you feel about this shift is up to you. I have my views,
which are not a mystery because they are publicly known,3 and I am
happy to elaborate on them. But regardless of what one thinks about
the underlying substantive policies—whether on immigration, the en-
vironment, or trade, for example—it is important to understand the
1. Matt Flegenheimer & Michael Barbaro, Donald Trump Is Elected President in
Stunning Repudiation of the Establishment, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2016, at A1,
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/09/us/politics/hillary-clinton-donald-trump-
president.html.
2. 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–808 (2012).
3. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Don’t Roll Back the Vehicle Fuel Standards, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/08/opinion/dont-roll-back-the-
vehicle-fuel-standards.html; Jody Freeman, Implications of Trump’s Victory and
the Republican Congress for Environmental, Climate and Energy Regulation: Not
as Bad as It Seems?, HARV. ENVTL. L. PROGRAM (Nov. 10, 2016), http://environ
ment.law.harvard.edu/postelection [https://perma.unl.edu/5PTT-NFAD]; Jody
Freeman, Professor Jody Freeman on Trump’s “2 for 1” Executive Order, HARV.
ENVTL. L. PROGRAM (Jan. 30, 2017), http://environment.law.harvard.edu/2017/01/
freemanstatement [http://perma.unl.edu/S8DH-YXCK]; Elias J. Groll, Freeman
Accepts Post with Obama, HARV. CRIMSON (Feb. 2, 2009), http://www.thecrimson
.com/article/2009/2/2/freeman-accepts-post-with-obama-law [http://perma.unl
.edu/A7NS-9XE6].
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way these regulatory instruments work and the extent to which they
are constrained by law.
II. OVERVIEW OF PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITIONS
Let me begin by providing an overview of a typical transition.
Many of you are familiar with what happens, but some of you may not
be, and it is helpful to explain the normal order of operations when a
new Administration takes over.
First of all, all political appointees resign.4 This includes the top-
level appointees in the Executive Branch both in the White House and
in the agencies.
Second, “acting” senior Executive Branch officials are put in place.
These officials are often holdovers from the prior Administration, as
we saw with Sally Yates at the Department of Justice.5 The acting
leadership stays in place until the Senate confirms the President’s
new nominees.6 This process is either slower or faster depending on
the pace of the nominations offered by the President and the amount
of opposition they encounter in the Senate.
By now, all of the agencies I study most closely because they have
the lion’s share of authority over federal environmental, natural-re-
source, and energy policy have their leadership confirmed: Scott
Pruitt at the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),7 Ryan Zinke at
the Department of the Interior,8 Rick Perry at the Department of En-
ergy (DOE),9 and Rex Tillerson at the State Department.10 As we
4. 2016 Transition Activities, PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION DIRECTORY, https://pre-
sidentialtransition.usa.gov/2016transitionactivities [http://perma.unl.edu/FU9E-
VMXR].
5. See Carrie Johnson & Jessica Taylor, Trump Fires Acting Attorney General for
Refusing to Defend Immigration Order, NPR (Jan. 30, 2017), http://www.npr.org/
2017/01/30/512534805/justice-department-wont-defend-trumps-immigration-
order.
6. See The Confirmation Process for Presidential Appointees, HERITAGE FOUND.,
http://www.heritage.org/political-process/heritage-explains/the-confirmation-pro-
cess-presidential-appointees [http://perma.unl.edu/5QRD-F53X].
7. Coral Davenport, Senate Confirms Scott Pruitt as E.P.A. Head, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
18, 2017, at A14, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/17/us/politics/scott-pruitt-en-
vironmental-protection-agency.html.
8. Esther Whieldon & Annie Snider, Senate Confirms Ryan Zinke as Interior Secre-
tary, POLITICO (Mar. 1, 2017), http://www.politico.com/story/2017/03/ryan-zinke-
confirmed-interior-secretary-235563 [http://perma.unl.edu/P87M-ZWHK].
9. Steven Mufson, Senate Votes to Confirm Former Texas Governor Rick Perry as
Energy Secretary, WASH. POST (Mar. 2, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/energy-environment/wp/2017/03/02/senate-votes-to-confirm-former-texas-
governor-rick-perry-as-energy-secretary/?utm_term=.2f5d5e800a76 [http://perma
.unl.edu/6H6Z-TN8U].
10. Gardiner Harris, Rex Tillerson Is Confirmed as Secretary of State Amid Record
Opposition, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2017, at A12, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/
01/us/politics/rex-tillerson-secretary-of-state-confirmed.html.
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have seen, Mr. Pruitt faced the strongest opposition, based on con-
cerns about his prior legal positions as Attorney General of Oklahoma,
his questioning of the scientific consensus on climate change, and po-
tential ethical conflicts.11 The Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion, which regulates the electricity sector and approves energy
infrastructure like natural gas pipelines, currently lacks a quorum, so
business at that independent regulatory agency has largely ground to
a halt.12 And many other agencies have yet to see their heads con-
firmed. We still do not have a Secretary of Agriculture,13 for example,
a position of obvious importance here in Nebraska. The ranks below
these top jobs are largely unfilled at the moment; the Trump Adminis-
tration has moved very slowly to fill the thousands of government jobs
it is entitled to fill.14 This could have serious repercussions if it goes
on for much longer.
The third aspect of presidential transitions to note is that career
staff in the agencies typically stay in place. These employees are civil
servants with certain job-security protections, and they do not tend to
leave unless there is a reason for them to do so. It is, by design, hard to
fire these employees, although agency heads have significant flexibil-
ity to reassign them.15
In addition to personnel, a variety of other things change quite a
bit during the transition. For example, websites are rebuilt to reflect
the commitments of the new Administration. The White House web-
site was updated almost immediately following the President’s swear-
11. See, e.g., Angela Anderson, The First Three Reasons Senators Should Oppose
Scott Pruitt for EPA, UNION CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (Dec. 8, 2016), http://
blog.ucsusa.org/angela-anderson/the-first-three-reasons-senators-should-oppose-
scott-pruitt-for-epa [http://perma.unl.edu/7YHC-DEVN]; Jeremy Symons, The
Growing Case Against Scott Pruitt’s Nomination to Lead the EPA, HILL (Feb. 1,
2017), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/energy-environment/317400-scott-
pruitt-cannot-be-trusted-to-lead-the-epa [http://perma.unl.edu/7XFK-FZTT].
12. See Lori Ann LaRocco, Energy CEOs Say Investor Money and Jobs at Risk Be-
cause FERC Isn’t Functional, CNBC (July 10, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/
07/10/energy-ceos-threaten-to-withdraw-investments-if-ferc-isnt-functional.html
[http://perma.unl.edu/Y62U-APZY].
13. Sonny Perdue has since been confirmed as the Secretary of Agriculture. Jose A.
DelReal & Caitlin Dewey, Senate Confirms Perdue as Agriculture Secretary,
WASH. POST (Apr. 24, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/senate-ex-
pected-to-confirm-perdue-as-agriculture-secretary/2017/04/24/82daf622-2468-
11e7-a1b3-faff0034e2de_story.html?utm_term=.cd540ab0b822 [http://perma.unl
.edu/KKM9-Y9UK].
14. Karen Yourish & Gregor Aisch, The Top Jobs in Trump’s Administration Are
Mostly Vacant: Who’s to Blame?, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/interac-
tive/2017/07/17/us/politics/trump-appointments.html (last updated July 20,
2017).
15. Federal Employee Termination Procedures, MSPB.ORG, https://www.mspb.org/
Federal-employee-termination-procedures.html [https://perma.unl.edu/JX6V-
VMF5].
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ing in.16 So, unsurprisingly, President Obama’s “Climate Action Plan”
is nowhere to be found, for example. And Executive Branch agencies
are now following suit. That means if you care about material that
appears on a website you visit frequently, you may want to save the
relevant documents, because they can disappear or become harder to
find. There is significant concern that this Administration will go fur-
ther than simply making cosmetic changes; scientists are worried that
much of the federal government’s scientific data on climate change
will disappear.17
Sometimes, in addition to revising websites, the new Administra-
tion will put constraints in place to prevent career staff in the agencies
from speaking to the press without supervision from political appoin-
tees to ensure message discipline. This is the first Administration I
can think of that issued a broad “gag order” of this kind, essentially
telling career staff to say nothing.18
This White House also went so far as to freeze contracts,19 which
affects some of the basic day-to-day work of government. We are talk-
ing about everything from toxic-waste cleanups to a variety of opera-
tional contracts that need to be executed to do the business of
government. If these are frozen for a period of time, it can be very
disabling.
It is also typical for a new Administration to temporarily freeze
regulations that have not been finalized in order to review the rules
for consistency with the new Administration’s priorities.20 Some of
these rules may have been submitted for regulatory review to the Of-
fice of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA)—which pursuant to
Executive Order 12,866 requires agencies to submit significant regu-
lations and detailed cost–benefit analyses to the White House.21 Some
16. Ashley Parker, White House Website Changes Fast, WASH. POST (Jan. 20, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/2017/live-updates/politics/live-coverage-
of-trumps-inauguration/white-house-website-changes-fast/?utm_term=.9aa672d6
d621 [http://perma.unl.edu/3JH2-72WJ].
17. See Amy Harmon, Activists Rush to Save Government Science Data—If They Can
Find It, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2017, at D1, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/06/
science/donald-trump-data-rescue-science.html.
18. Mathew Ingram, Trump Administration Puts Gag Order on Several Government
Agencies, FORTUNE (Jan. 24, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/01/24/trump-gag-or-
der [http://perma.unl.edu/HZM3-9VPT].
19. See, e.g., Brady Dennis & Juliet Eilperin, Trump Administration Tells EPA to
Freeze All Grants, Contracts, WASH. POST (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.washing
tonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2017/01/23/trump-administration-
tells-epa-to-freeze-all-grants-contracts/?utm_term=.3a35b62107c4 [http://perma
.unl.edu/C69Z-E9LZ].
20. See Memorandum from Reince Priebus, Assistant to the President & Chief of
Staff, to the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies (Jan. 20, 2017), https://www.white
house.gov/the-press-office/2017/01/20/memorandum-heads-executive-depart-
ments-and-agencies [http://perma.unl.edu/6VXY-99LV].
21. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993).
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may have been proposed but not yet finalized by the responsible
agency. While every outgoing Administration rushes to complete sig-
nificant rulemakings before leaving office, several major rules typi-
cally get caught in these “regulatory freeze” orders.
Soon after a transition, the new Administration must prepare the
President’s proposed budget. The budget document reflects the Presi-
dent’s priorities and speaks to his constituencies. It appears as if this
budget seeks to dramatically cut funding for the agencies, signaling
President Trump’s de-regulatory agenda.22 Some observers anticipate
very deep cuts for the most disfavored agencies, like the EPA.23 It is
important to note, however, that the presidential budget is not self-
executing. It is essentially a wish list. Congress ultimately decides
which, if any, of the President’s proposals will be converted into law.
In addition to nominations, gag orders, regulatory freezes, and
budget preparation, transitions naturally bring substantive policy
shifts, many of which are announced with much fanfare via executive
orders signed soon after a new President takes office. These orders are
a highly visible way for an incoming President to signal that there is a
new sheriff in town, and the Trump Administration has made profli-
gate use of this mechanism. Here [showing PowerPoint slide] is a
screen shot of the White House website with a number of new execu-
tive orders and presidential memoranda listed.24 You see, for exam-
ple, the immigration order that the courts have at least temporarily
blocked and which the White House has said it will replace.25 As a
practical matter, there is not much difference between executive or-
ders and presidential memoranda—both can be used to direct execu-
tive agencies to undertake certain regulatory or deregulatory efforts,
or to reconsider certain policies.26 Executive orders are considered to
be more formal than presidential memos—they are required to be
22. See Gregory Krieg & Will Mullery, Trump’s Budget by the Numbers: What Gets
Cut and Why?, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2017/05/23/politics/trump-budget-cuts-
programs/index.html [http://perma.unl.edu/6LLR-UHXS] (last updated May 23,
2017).
23. Brady Dennis & Juliet Eilperin, EPA Remains Top Target with Trump Adminis-
tration Proposing 31 Percent Budget Cut, WASH. POST (May 23, 2017), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2017/05/22/epa-re-
mains-top-target-with-trump-administration-proposing-31-percent-budget-cut/
?utm_term=.b2969cac14ed [http://perma.unl.edu/6JYF-H4TZ].
24. See Presidential Actions, WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-
room/presidential-actions (last visited Oct. 19, 2017).
25. The legal battle regarding this immigration order has continued. Meridith Mc-
Graw et al., A Timeline of Trump’s Immigration Executive Order and Legal Chal-
lenges, ABC NEWS (June 29, 2017), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/timeline-presi
dent-trumps-immigration-executive-order-legal-challenges/story?id=45332741
[http://perma.unl.edu/RD3F-29NZ].
26. See generally Phillip J. Cooper, The Law: Presidential Memoranda and Executive
Orders: Of Patchwork Quilts, Trump Cards, and Shell Games, 31 PRESIDENTIAL
STUD. Q. 126 (2001).
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published in the Federal Register and given an identifying number,
and are considered legally binding.27 But neither type of action can
contravene legislation, meaning that if there is a conflict with existing
law, the law governs.
A new President faces the question whether to withdraw rules that
have been proposed but not finalized and whether to rescind rules that
have been finalized and may already have been implemented to some
extent. President Trump has already indicated that he will withdraw
and rescind a variety of environmental rules, especially those related
to climate change, but also various regulations affecting the oil-and-
gas industry and energy policy.28
A new Administration must also decide what to do about pending
litigation. After any presidential transition, but especially when the
White House changes parties, the Department of Justice (DOJ) must
reconsider the positions it has already taken on behalf of the prior
Administration as those cases move through the federal courts. A new
President may want the DOJ to abandon its defense of certain rules,
but he cannot simply order the Department to do so. There is an estab-
lished process to follow.29 If the DOJ lawyers have already briefed a
case, they typically do not change their position until the client agency
has taken steps to reverse its position.30 Once the DOJ can point to a
concrete legal shift, like a notice of proposed rulemaking that the
agency is reconsidering the rule, it will go into court and say, “Our
client agency has reversed its position and we now must change ours.”
It is not enough though for the White House to say, “We don’t like this
rule anymore.”
III. CLIMATE CHANGE AS AN ILLUSTRATION
OF POLICY CHANGE
With that background in mind, I thought I might offer an example
of how policy can change from Administration to Administration,
drawing on the example of climate change. I would like to illustrate
how the regulatory system is “sticky,” meaning that there are many
obstacles to dramatic policy shifts. I am sure there are differing opin-
ions about this feature of government—some of you may be happy to
learn this, and some of you might find it frustrating, but the fact is
that the federal bureaucracy is something like a super tanker, and it
27. See id. at 127–28.
28. See, e.g., Nadja Popovich & Tatiana Schlossberg, 23 Environmental Rules Rolled
Back in Trump’s First 100 Days, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes
.com/interactive/2017/05/02/climate/environmental-rules-reversed-trump-100-
days.html.
29. See generally James R. Harvey III, Loyalty in Government Litigation: Department
of Justice Representation of Agency Clients, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1569 (1996).
30. Id.
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is hard to turn a super tanker on a dime. Now, it is not hard to an-
nounce that you are going to do many things. Already, we have seen a
lot of announcements in the forms of the presidential memos and exec-
utive orders I cited, but there is a real difference between announcing
plans and executing plans to revise or repeal regulations. And the
chief constraint of relevance to us, in this room, is law. In our democ-
racy, law is a very significant constraint on the ambitions of any new
Administration.
My example is President Obama’s legacy on climate and energy
policy, which is embodied in a variety of regulations and other Execu-
tive Branch policies, all of which the Trump Administration has an-
nounced it intends to unravel. To understand what a rollback would
entail, you first need to know what the Obama Administration put in
place. For those of you who follow energy, environmental law, climate
change, and related topics, this will all sound familiar, but for some in
the audience, a quick review will be helpful.
A. Obama-Era Climate Change Policy
There are two main pillars to climate change policy in the Obama
Administration: regulations to control greenhouse gases from the
transportation sector of the U.S. economy and regulations to control
greenhouse-gas emissions from the electricity sector. These rules
would cover almost two-thirds of U.S. greenhouse-gas emissions, so if
implemented, they would have a significant impact on reducing our
emissions.31 These regulatory policies were the second-best option
which the Administration adopted when Congress failed to pass a cli-
mate bill in 2010.32 And they are the building blocks for the U.S.
pledge to the Paris Accord to reduce our emissions between twenty-six
and twenty-eight percent compared to 2005 levels by 2025.33
Let’s start with the transportation sector.34 Everyone is familiar
with fuel-efficiency standards, which are known by the acronym
CAFE, which stands for Corporate Average Fuel Economy.35 The Na-
31. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 430-R-16-002, INVENTORY OF GREENHOUSE GAS
EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990–2014, at 2-22 to 2-32 (2016).
32. Evan Lehmann, Senate Abandons Climate Effort, Dealing Blow to President, N.Y.
TIMES (July 23, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2010/07/23/23climatewire-
senate-abandons-climate-effort-dealing-blow-88864.html?pagewanted=all.
33. UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, U.S.A. FIRST
NDC SUBMISSION, http://www4.unfccc.int/ndcregistry/PublishedDocuments/Uni
ted%20States%20of%20America%20First/U.S.A.%20First%20NDC%20Submis
sion.pdf [http://perma.unl.edu/8Z47-GAQ6].
34. See generally Jody Freeman, The Obama Administration’s National Auto Policy:
Lessons from the “Car Deal”, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 343 (2011).
35. Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average
Fuel Economy Standards; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324, 25,329–30 (May 7,
2010) (codified in scattered parts of 40 and 49 C.F.R.).
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tional Highway Traffic Safety Administration sets these standards for
cars and trucks pursuant to statutes passed by Congress, which focus
on energy-efficient appliances and cars and the like, including most
recently the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007.36 Also in
2007, the Supreme Court ruled that the EPA has the authority to reg-
ulate greenhouse-gas pollution from cars and trucks under the Clean
Air Act, introducing the EPA as a second regulator for the auto indus-
try.37 Improving efficiency and cutting pollution from vehicles require
the same thing, which is to reduce the amount of gasoline burned. The
interesting twist is that there is a third potential regulator in this
mix. The Clean Air Act has a special provision allowing California to
set its own pollution standards for cars and trucks if necessary to ad-
dress the state’s unique air pollution problems, which also authorizes
other states to copy them.38 Upon taking office, President Obama was
faced with this potentially fragmented approach to regulating the auto
industry, and he saw an opportunity to harmonize all of these stan-
dards. In exchange for the regulatory certainty that would come with
harmonization, however, the industry would need to commit to im-
proving the efficiency of all cars and trucks steadily over the years, for
each make and model, regardless of the composition of each fleet.39
Under this program, each auto company is required to meet a differ-
ent target based on the mix of vehicles it sells to consumers. In fact,
the agencies set different standards for each type of vehicle, taking
into account its particular footprint, which results in a sliding scale of
stringency—lower standards for the largest cars and trucks and
higher standards for the smaller ones.
The White House conducted a negotiation over these standards in
which the two regulatory agencies worked closely together and con-
sulted extensively with the auto industry, ultimately producing an
agreement to set a CAFE standard of 54.5 miles per gallon by 2025,
which would approximately double fuel efficiency compared to the
2010 standards.40 The caveat here is that this standard is really a
projection based on an estimate of what consumers will buy, and if it
turns out that consumers buy a very different mix of vehicles than
what was assumed in the government’s modeling (e.g., many more
36. 42 U.S.C. §§ 17001–17386 (2012).
37. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
38. Freeman, supra note 34, at 349–50.
39. Juliet Eilperin, Automakers, Obama Administration Agree on Fuel Efficiency
Standards Through 2025, WASH. POST (July 27, 2011), https://www.washington
post.com/national/health-science/obama-administration-auto-industry-strike-
deal-on-vehicle-fuel-efficiency/2011/07/27/gIQA72mKdI_story.html?utm_term=
.908997b785d5 [http://perma.unl.edu/9V2Q-L6ZP].
40. See Bill Vlasic, Carmakers Back Strict New Rules for Gas Mileage, N.Y. TIMES,
July 29, 2011, at A1, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/29/business/carmakers-
back-strict-new-rules-for-gas-mileage.html.
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SUVs and fewer small cars), the standards achieved in practice will
fall short of the initial projection. And that is precisely what has hap-
pened as oil prices have cratered: SUVs have been flying off the lots.41
I am happy to take questions on all of this later, but for now it’s impor-
tant just to appreciate that the Administration established a new com-
prehensive regulatory framework for addressing greenhouse-gas
emissions from the transport sector, which is responsible for about one
third of U.S. emissions. It began by setting standards for light-duty
passenger vehicles, which it did in two phases from 2012–201642 and
2017–2025,43 and later took the same approach to medium- and
heavy-duty trucks.44
The second key climate policy adopted by the Obama Administra-
tion is known as the Clean Power Plan, which sets greenhouse-gas
emission standards for the nation’s new and existing fossil fuel-fired
power plants.45 The standards for the existing fleet of fossil fuel-fired
plants is the most important and controversial part of the Plan be-
cause these plants are old, dirty, lightly regulated if regulated at all,
and have been in operation on average for much longer than what was
originally anticipated as their useful lives. They have been clunking
along, for some of them, well over fifty years.46
The question facing the Administration was how to deal with
greenhouse gases from these plants under the authority provided in
41. See Nathan Bomey, Used Cars Get Cheaper as People Buy More SUVs, USA TO-
DAY (June 23, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/cars/2017/06/23/
used-car-prices-falling/415559001 [http://perma.unl.edu/A7TW-LZVP].
42. Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average
Fuel Economy Standards; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324, 25,409 (May 7, 2010)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 531, 533, 536–38).
43. 2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and
Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 62,624, 62,771–72
(Oct. 15, 2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts 85, 86, 600 and 49 C.F.R. pts 523,
531, 536, 537).
44. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium- and
Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles—Phase 2, 81 Fed. Reg. 73,478, 73,684–86
(Oct. 25, 2016) (codified in scattered parts of 40 C.F.R.); Greenhouse Gas Emis-
sions Standards and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium- and Heavy-Duty En-
gines and Vehicles, 76 Fed. Reg. 57,106, 57,134–97 (Sept. 15, 2011) (codified in
scattered parts of 40 and 49 C.F.R.).
45. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 60); Climate Change: Obama Unveils Clean Power Plan, BBC NEWS
(Aug. 3, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-33753067 [http://per
ma.unl.edu/HYL4-NCM4].
46. Richard L. Revesz & Jack Lienke, Obama Takes a Crucial Step on Climate
Change, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/04/opinion/
obama-takes-a-crucial-step-on-climate-change.html  (“Traditionally, the economi-
cally useful life of a coal-fired plant was thought to be about 30 years.  As of 2014,
coal-fired plants in the United States had been operating for an average of 42
years, and many plants had been in service far longer”).
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the Clean Air Act in order to reduce GHG emissions from the electric-
ity sector. The EPA decided to use a little-known section of the Act
which allows the Agency to set standards for pollutants that are not
otherwise controlled under the Act’s major pollution programs.47 This
gap-filling section of the law requires the states to set performance
standards for existing sources of otherwise unregulated pollutants,
subject to guidelines issued by EPA.48 Importantly, the Act defines
the performance standards the states must set in terms of the “best
system of emissions reduction” that in the EPA Administrator’s view
has been adequately demonstrated to be achievable by the regulated
sources.49
The most controversial aspect of this rulemaking is the EPA’s view
that the “best system” for reducing emissions of GHGs from these
sources can entail a “grid-wide” approach, which takes into account
opportunities to reduce emissions at a particular source by substitut-
ing another less polluting source, for example by substituting lower
polluting natural gas and renewables for higher polluting coal-fired
plants to produce the same amount of energy on the interconnected
grid.50 This approach goes beyond requiring minor operational or
equipment modifications to improve efficiency that each plant could
make to units on-site.
Reacting to what they viewed as the EPA’s overreach, twenty-eight
states, including the State of Nebraska, along with a variety of utility-
sector stakeholders, sued to challenge the rule.51 This fall, the District
of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals heard argument en banc (with a
full complement of the court’s ten active judges) over the legality of
the plan.52 The consensus view after the arguments was that the Gov-
ernment won the day; it seemed unlikely, based on the judges’ ques-
tions, that there would be six votes to invalidate the Clean Power
Plan.53 But that was before the presidential election. Following the
47. Recent Regulation, EPA Interprets the Clean Air Act to Allow Regulation of Car-
bon Dioxide Emissions from Existing Power Plants, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1152,
1154–56 (2016).
48. Id. at 1154.
49. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (2012) (“The term ‘standard of performance’
means a standard for emissions of air pollutants which reflects the degree of
emission limitation achievable through the application of the best system of emis-
sion reduction which . . . the Administrator determines has been adequately
demonstrated.”).
50. See generally LINDA TSANG & ALEXANDRA M. WYATT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R44480, CLEAN POWER PLAN: LEGAL BACKGROUND AND PENDING LITIGATION IN
WEST VIRGINIA V. EPA (2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44480.pdf [http://per
ma.unl.edu/ADT2-WB6Y].
51. Id. at 10.
52. Id. at 15–16.
53. See Jonathan H. Adler, The En Banc D.C. Circuit Meets the Clean Power Plan,
WASH. POST (Sept. 28, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-con
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election, the Trump Administration asked the Department of Justice
to request that the court hold the case in abeyance, and although the
case was both briefed and argued, the court agreed. The court has yet
to issue an opinion and may never do so.
Thus, when the Obama Administration left office, it had adopted
two important rules to address greenhouse-gas emissions: one to con-
trol emissions from the transportation sector and the other to limit
emissions from the utility sector. Neither had been done before.
The Obama Administration took a variety of other steps too, in-
cluding adopting rules to regulate methane from new oil-and-gas facil-
ities on both public and private land.54 Methane is a highly potent
greenhouse gas, about twenty-five times the global warming potential
of carbon dioxide,55 so limiting venting to the atmosphere is impor-
tant. The Obama DOE strengthened many appliance efficiency stan-
dards for things like microwaves, fridges, and TVs, which consume
huge amounts of energy and which had been stalled for years, even
though technology exists to make them much more energy efficient.56
The Obama Administration also prioritized siting renewable-en-
ergy installations by accelerating the permitting process and working
with the states to get big solar and wind installations built on public
lands.57 And recall that, at the beginning of the Administration, when
Congress passed the Recovery Act to shore up the faltering economy,
at least sixty billion dollars was directed to spending on energy, in-
cluding grid improvements, battery technologies, and advanced vehi-
spiracy/wp/2016/09/28/the-en-banc-d-c-circuit-meets-the-clean-power-plan/?utm_
term=.72f8adb987eb [http://perma.unl.edu/3UFQ-NPTQ].
54. Press Release, Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Releases First-Ever Standards to Cut
Methane Emissions from the Oil and Gas Sector (May 12, 2016), https://www.epa
.gov/newsreleases/epa-releases-first-ever-standards-cut-methane-emissions-oil-
and-gas-sector [http://perma.unl.edu/X63A-USGU]; see Oil and Natural Gas Sec-
tor: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified Sources; Final
Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 35,824 (July 3, 2016) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60); Waste Pre-
vention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource Conservation; Final Rule,
81 Fed. Reg. 83,008 (Nov. 18, 2016) (codified at 43 C.F.R. pts. 3100, 3160, 3170).
55. See Understanding Global Warming Potentials, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/
ghgemissions/understanding-global-warming-potentials [http://perma.unl.edu/
ZY2S-8WBK].
56. See NRDC, STRONG U.S. ENERGY EFFICIENCY STANDARDS: DECADES OF USING EN-
ERGY SMARTER 3–4 (2014), https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/appliance-en-
ergy-efficiency-standards-FS.pdf [http://perma.unl.edu/A7VM-L3V4].
57. Jenny Rowland & Julie Katsnelson, The Obama Administration Just Made It
Easier to Put Solar and Wind On Public Lands, THINKPROGRESS (Nov. 11, 2016),
https://thinkprogress.org/solar-leasing-public-lands-rule-29eb962804ce [http://
perma.unl.edu/PA6L-RMHR].
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cle technologies.58 The Administration also supported extending tax
credits for renewable energy, which many Republicans also support.59
The final aspect of the Obama legacy to note is the President’s com-
mitment to negotiating the international climate agreement and his
historic partnership with President Xi of China. It was striking for
these two leaders to shake hands and publicly say they would work
together on the Paris Accord.60 This Accord was a breakthrough in
international climate change negotiations because it encompasses all
of the world’s major economies, both developed and developing, unlike
the Kyoto Protocol, which created a bifurcated regime in which only
the developed world committed to binding emissions cuts.61
B. Trump Administration Changes to Climate Change
Policy
All of this background on the Obama Administration’s policies is
necessary to set the stage for the key questions, which are: What can a
new Administration do to change course, using which instruments,
and what are the constraints on dramatic policy reversals?
This next slide contains the list of what President Trump has indi-
cated he might want to reverse on climate and energy policy. First, he
could withdraw from the Paris Agreement. There is clearly an internal
debate about this question. Yet, although this decision is the Presi-
dent’s alone and is not reviewable by any court, withdrawing from the
Paris Agreement is not something the President can do instantane-
ously with the stroke of a pen. He can announce his intent to withdraw
the United States from the Accord, but he can’t effectuate it right
away because the Accord contains a four-year withdrawal process.62
58. Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, White House, Fact Sheet: The Recovery
Act Made the Largest Single Investment in Clean Energy in History, Driving the
Deployment of Clean Energy, Promoting Energy Efficiency, and Supporting Man-
ufacturing (Feb. 25, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-of-
fice/2016/02/25/fact-sheet-recovery-act-made-largest-single-investment-clean-
energy [http://perma.unl.edu/2L9M-8BBX].
59. Id.
60. Mark Landler & Jane Perlez, Rare Harmony as China and U.S. Commit to Cli-
mate Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2016, at A1, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/04/
world/asia/obama-xi-jinping-china-climate-accord.html?mtrref=www.google.com
&gwh=688C4C116461142F915A6CC7AF51AC6D&gwt=pay.
61. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
adopted Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (entered into force Feb. 16, 2005) [hereinafter
Kyoto Protocol].
62. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Adoption of the Paris Agreement,
U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1 (Dec. 12, 2015), https://unfccc.int/resource/
docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf [http://perma.unl.edu/3YTM-FUGD]; Chelsea
Harvey, Withdrawing From the Paris Deal Takes Four Years. Our Next President
Could Join Again in 30 Days, WASH. POST (June 5, 2017), https://www.washing
tonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2017/06/05/withdrawing-from-the-
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In fact, the day President Trump’s withdrawal would take effect
would be the day after the next presidential election. And a new Ad-
ministration could always reverse Trump’s decision and reaffirm the
United States’ commitment or submit a new U.S. pledge.
The much more concerning possibility is that the Administration
might go one step further and withdraw from the underlying interna-
tional agreement known as the U.N. Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change, which was negotiated by the George H.W. Bush
Administration in 1992 and was supported by the Senate at the time
on a bipartisan basis.63 That process would take only one year and
would be much more disruptive. It seems unlikely that the President
would go this far—rejecting a deal struck by a Republican President
that attracted not a single dissenting vote in the Senate and that com-
mits the United States to nothing onerous or even binding—but it is
always a possibility. Rejoining that ratified treaty could be somewhat
more onerous than recommitting to the Paris Accord, which was
signed by the President as an executive agreement.64
It’s also worth noting that the Administration does not need to
withdraw from the Paris Accord in order to renege on the U.S. pledge.
That is because the agreement depends on voluntary domestic action,
and if the Administration chooses to roll back the key domestic regula-
tory pillars of the pledge—the fuel efficiency standards and the Clean
Power Plan—it can effectively thwart our ability to fulfill our Paris
commitment. So withdrawal would not really be about meeting or not
meeting the U.S. pledge; it would really be a politically motivated ges-
ture: a gift to the President’s constituents, a crystal-clear message
about how the Administration views climate change, and a symbolic
thumb in the eye to the rest of the world.
In addition, President Trump could direct his EPA Administrator,
Scott Pruitt, to rescind the Clean Power Plan (something that Pruitt is
champing at the bit to do; he’s made no secret of it; recall that he was
the Attorney General of Oklahoma and joined the litigation challeng-
ing the Plan).65 But again, the President cannot instantaneously ac-
paris-deal-takes-four-years-our-next-president-could-join-again-in-30-days/?utm_
term=.3376faa3cc8a [http://perma.unl.edu/U9P3-GH94].
63. See President George H. W. Bush, Statement on Signing the Instrument of Ratifi-
cation for the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, AM.
PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Oct. 13, 1992), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=21
611 [http://perma.unl.edu/M425-DZMP].
64. Zack Colman, Trump Told Pruitt to Make Plan to Leave Paris Deal, Stay in
UNFCCC, CLIMATE HOME (May 31, 2017), http://www.climatechangenews.com/
2017/05/31/trump-told-pruitt-make-plan-leave-paris-deal-stay-unfccc [https://
perma.unl.edu/3AJ7-PP35] (explaining the difference between the UNFCCC and
the Paris Agreement).
65. Chris Mooney, Brady Dennis & Steven Mufson, Trump Names Scott Pruitt,
Oklahoma Attorney General Suing EPA on Climate Change, To Head the EPA,
WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-envi-
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complish this reversal simply by issuing an executive order. Pursuant
to the Administrative Procedure Act,66 the federal law that governs
federal agency action, as it has been interpreted by the D.C. Circuit, a
legally binding rule can only be rescinded through the same process
used to adopt it, which requires notice-and-comment rulemaking—a
process that takes quite a bit of time.67 Now, the President can cer-
tainly announce that he wants to rescind the Clean Power Plan, but
since pollution control is the EPA’s statutory responsibility, the
Agency must undertake any rescission, and in doing so, it must follow
the legally required process. What the Agency chooses to do must also
survive judicial review since litigation will almost certainly ensue,
challenging the Agency’s legal authority to do what it has done or ar-
guing that it has been arbitrary, or both.
At the same time, the Trump Administration could take steps to
rescind or weaken a variety of other legally effective rules, including
the methane standards I mentioned, the rule regulating hydraulic
fracturing on public lands, or even appliance efficiency standards. But
in all of these cases, the responsible agency, whether the EPA, DOI, or
DOE, must go through the notice-and-comment process and must de-
fend its actions against legal challenge. The longer the rules have
been in place, the harder they may be to undo because of reliance in-
terests: regulated entities will have spent money complying with these
rules, and courts take reliance interests into account when reviewing
an agency’s decision to change course.68 Generally speaking, the exis-
tence of significant reliance interests will tend to constrain the
agency’s flexibility to do an about-face on a rule.69 In some instances,
larger or more established businesses that are committed to meeting
regulatory standards will want to keep baseline rules in place in order
to prevent smaller or newer businesses, which are less inclined to fol-
low the rules, from gaining a competitive advantage. Moreover, there
is only so much bandwidth in any agency, and it takes focus and re-
sources to rewrite these rules. If the EPA were to rush the rulemaking
process, or if the White House were to truncate the OIRA’s normally
rigorous regulatory review, the rules could be more vulnerable to in-
validation in the courts.
ronment/wp/2016/12/07/trump-names-scott-pruitt-oklahoma-attorney-general-
suing-epa-on-climate-change-to-head-the-epa/?utm_term=.18637398c4d4 [http://
perma.unl.edu/6DPW-SCN7].
66. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500–596 (2012).
67. See generally Robert A. Anthony, “Interpretive” Rules, “Legislative” Rules and
“Spurious” Rules: Lifting the Smog, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1, 15–22 (1994).
68. See generally Anita S. Krishnakumar, Longstanding Agency Interpretations, 83
FORDHAM L. REV. 1823, 1854–56 (2015).
69. See generally Randy J. Kozel & Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Administrative Change, 59
UCLA L. REV. 112 (2011).
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Beyond the Clean Power Plan, the Administration could try to re-
scind the “endangerment finding,” which is the EPA’s science-based
determination that greenhouse gases pose a sufficient danger to
health and the environment that they warrant regulation.70 This
move would invite a firestorm of criticism because it would mean that
the EPA has decided to reject the overwhelming scientific consensus
on climate change, which is documented in the EPA’s elaborate
rulemaking record and in the voluminous peer-reviewed literature.71
Here again though, the EPA would have to go through a notice-and-
comment process and defend its decision in court to an audience of
judges that would undoubtedly be skeptical. Even conservative judges
will be dubious about an agency reversal based on the most outlier
claims when those claims contradict a staggering amount of scientific
evidence. As a matter of training and temperament, judges are not
especially open to “alternative facts.”72 Still, it’s possible to imagine
the Trump Administration taking this particular litigation risk to
make a political point—which is that it just doesn’t believe the science
of climate change. Several cabinet officials, including Scott Pruitt,
have questioned the science,73 as has President Trump.74
Already, the Administration has signaled that it will reconsider
the later years of the GHG/CAFE standards for cars and trucks, which
70. In reality, there is not just one but several endangerment findings—these find-
ings are the legal predicate to regulation under various Clean Air Act programs
that address mobile and stationary sources. Endangerment and Cause or Con-
tribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act,
74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1).
71. BENJAMIN DEANGELO ET AL., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ENDANGERMENT AND
CAUSE OR CONTRIBUTE FINDINGS FOR GREENHOUSE GASES UNDER SECTION 202(A)
OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT (2009), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-08/
documents/endangerment_tsd.pdf [http://perma.unl.edu/E7SX-9SKM].
72. President Trump’s senior adviser Kellyanne Conway called White House Press
Secretary Sean Spicer’s claims about the crowd size at the inauguration “alterna-
tive facts,” a statement which caused the phrase to gain instant popularity. See
Eric Bradner, Conway: Trump White House Offered “Alternative Facts” on Crowd
Size, CNN (Jan. 23, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/22/politics/kellyanne-con-
way-alternative-facts/index.html [http://perma.unl.edu/RBL7-Y488]; Conway:
“Alternative Facts”, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (Jan. 22, 2017), https://www.merriam-
webster.com/news-trend-watch/conway-alternative-facts-20170122 [http://perma
.unl.edu/F7Q8-3XQV] (stating Internet searches of the word “facts” spiked after
Kellyanne Conway described statements as alternative facts).
73. See Mazin Sidahmed, Climate Change Denial in the Trump Cabinet: Where Do
His Nominees Stand?, GUARDIAN (Dec. 15, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/
environment/2016/dec/15/trump-cabinet-climate-change-deniers [http://perma
.unl.edu/Z6FT-Z63R].
74. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Nov. 6, 2012, 2:15 PM), https://
twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/265895292191248385?lang=en [http://perma
.unl.edu/7YRS-X8P2].
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the EPA set through 2025.75 But there are significant constraints on
doing so: some legal, some political, and some pragmatic. Just before
the Obama Administration left office, the EPA conducted a mid-term
review (one that had been promised by the Agency as part of the
agreement with the industry, but which the EPA rushed to complete
ahead of the 2018 deadline) and made a “determination” that the stan-
dards for the later years, from 2022–2025 are still reasonable and
achievable by the industry.76 The Trump Administration has already
announced that it will reexamine this finding.77 But the rules them-
selves, which set the standards, are legally binding. To freeze,
weaken, or amend them would require the same legal process dis-
cussed earlier, which is notice-and-comment rulemaking.78
If the EPA does undertake a rulemaking, it is possible that the
Agency might do something fairly modest to make compliance easier
for the auto industry in the post-2020 period. But they could go farther
and weaken the standards substantially or even freeze them. There
are real risks to such a move. First, the auto industry may not be en-
tirely aligned on the stringency question. Companies plan their new
model years well in advance and may have already sunk considerable
costs into compliance. Some companies may prefer stricter rules be-
cause they think it plays to their competitive advantage. The auto
companies also value regulatory certainty and uniformity—in fact,
that was the big prize for them in supporting these standards.79 And
auto-parts or -component manufacturers might be against any weak-
ening of the standards.
Most importantly, if the Obama-era agreement unravels, Califor-
nia will withdraw its support from the federal standards. It will re-
verse its decision to “deem” compliance with the federal standards to
be compliant with the state’s own stricter standards and seek to en-
force its own standards instead. California would claim the authority
to do this under the preemption waiver it has already received from
the Obama EPA, which goes to 2025. The EPA would have to revoke
the waiver (something for which there is no precedent) or sue Califor-
nia to challenge its authority.
One way or another, a significant rollback of the historic fuel-econ-
omy standards could backfire on the auto industry and land them pre-
75. Sonari Glinton, Trump Administration Takes Key Step to Rolling Back Auto Fuel
Standards, NPR (Aug. 14, 2017), http://www.npr.org/2017/08/14/543474251/
trump-administration-takes-key-step-to-rolling-back-auto-fuel-standards.
76. Brad Plumer, Trump’s Plan to Roll Back Obama’s Fuel Economy Rules for Cars,
Explained, VOX (Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/
2017/3/15/14828070/trump-fuel-economy-standards [http://perma.unl.edu/B7RR-
2KB5].
77. Id.
78. See Anthony, supra note 67, at 15–22.
79. Freeman, supra note 34.
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cisely where they were ten years ago—staring at the prospect of
discordant regulation and years of litigation. Congress could take the
drastic step of amending the Clean Air Act to eliminate California’s
special status, but that move would face significant opposition and
would likely fail unless the legislative filibuster rule is changed to al-
low passage with only fifty votes in the Senate. While I do not entirely
rule out this possibility, it does not seem like the most likely path.
There are, however, a number of other less visible policies that the
Administration can change quite easily with the stroke of a pen. For
example, President Trump can adopt a new method for how the U.S.
government calculates the costs and benefits of reducing greenhouse
gases. Right now, agencies must calculate the “social cost of carbon”
when proposing new rules.80 If a rule will increase carbon pollution,
that cost is factored in, and if it will reduce carbon pollution, that ben-
efit is factored in.81 The Administration can essentially attach a lower
value to reducing a ton of carbon pollution, which means that it will be
marginally harder to justify rules that are helpful in addressing cli-
mate change, like energy-efficiency standards and greenhouse-gas
emission standards. Likewise, rules that may cause an increase in
carbon pollution won’t suffer quite as much of a hit on the cost side of
the cost–benefit calculation. Because the social cost of carbon is deter-
mined by OIRA pursuant to a Clinton-era executive order,82 its ap-
proach can change just because the President wants it to.
Some policy shifts require relatively little process. For example,
the Trump Administration could lift the Obama Administration’s tem-
porary limit on new coal leasing on federal lands, which it imposed to
conduct a comprehensive environmental-impact study of the leasing
program.83 This policy was adopted by secretarial order, not rulemak-
ing, so the new Secretary of the Interior could simply reverse it.84
There are some lingering questions about the legal obligations an
agency has once it has begun an environmental-impact analysis under
the applicable federal law, so the decision could be challenged in court,
but a simple signature by the Interior Secretary, Ryan Zinke, would
lift the pause.
In addition, President Trump could try to reverse his predecessor’s
withdrawal of federal lands from oil-and-gas development. President
Obama protected a significant share of offshore areas from oil-and-gas
80. See generally Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Climate Regulation and the
Limits of Cost–Benefit Analysis, 99 CAL. L. REV. 1557 (2011).
81. Id. at 1577–79.
82. Exec. Order No. 12,866, supra note 21.
83. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Secretary Jewell Launches Comprehen-
sive Review of Federal Coal Program (Jan. 15, 2016), https://www.doi.gov/press-
releases/secretary-jewell-launches-comprehensive-review-federal-coal-program
[http://perma.unl.edu/5B3L-J432].
84. See id.
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drilling before he left office, including areas offshore in the Arctic and
the Atlantic. He did so under a legal provision in the Outer Continen-
tal Shelf Lands Act,85 which allows presidential withdrawals, but
there is an open question about whether such withdrawals are perma-
nent or can be reversed.86 If President Trump does try to cancel these
withdrawals, litigation over his authority to do so is certain to follow.
The same would be true if the President tried to reverse or dramati-
cally shrink designations of national monuments.87
All of these policy shifts and more are possible, but they will not be
immediate. They must follow applicable law, they must be defended in
court if litigated, and all of them would be legally challenged. My over-
arching point is that federal executive power is not absolute or uncon-
strained; indeed, far from it. The President is limited not only by the
Constitution but also by the Administrative Procedure Act, which
some scholars have called “quasi-constitutional” because of its outsize
importance in ensuring that government agencies act in a rational,
transparent, and accountable manner consistent with their statutory
mandates.88
IV. CONSTRAINTS ON PRESIDENTIAL POLICY REVERSALS
So let me move on now and talk a bit more about the constraints on
presidential policy reversals. How much flexibility does a President
have? First, the Constitution constrains what the President can do.89
Second, agencies are constrained by their governing statutes, from
which they derive the legal authority to act.90 The statute the agency
is purporting to implement, whether it’s an immigration law, an envi-
ronmental law, or anything else, determines the scope of the agency’s
authority.91 Some statutes confer broad power upon an agency, but
others can be quite specific. A law like the Clean Air Act can establish
a legal threshold an agency must meet before regulating, dictate the
85. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1356b (2012).
86. See, e.g., Tom DiChristopher, Environmental Groups Sue Trump in a Bid to De-
fend Obama’s Arctic Drilling Ban, CNBC (May 3, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/
2017/05/03/conservation-groups-sue-trump-to-defend-obamas-arctic-drilling-ban
.html?view=story&%24DEVICE%24=native-android-mobile [http://perma.unl
.edu/7RDK-7F63].
87. John D. Leshy & Mark Squillace, The Endangered Antiquities Act, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 1, 2017, at A23, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/31/opinion/the-endan
gered-antiquities-act.html.
88. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, The American Model of Federal Administrative Law:
Remembering the First One Hundred Years, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 975, 980
(2010); Mila Sohoni, The Administrative Constitution in Exile, 57 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 923, 937 (2016).
89. Ilan Wurman, Constitutional Administration, 69 STAN. L. REV. 359 (2017).
90. See Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Lost World of Administrative
Law, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1144–45 (2014).
91. Id.
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steps an agency must take to develop and justify a regulation, and
sometimes even specify what data is necessary to support a regulatory
choice. And this is all above and beyond what the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act requires. In this sense, law constrains the bureaucracy. I
like to say to my students that an agency head does not wake up in the
morning—whether the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of the Inte-
rior, or the EPA Administrator—and say, “I think I will do whatever I
want today.” Agencies are creatures of statute. Congress has dele-
gated them certain powers, and they may not act beyond their author-
ity—the limits of which are, ultimately, determined by the courts.
In addition to the limits imposed by an agency’s governing statute,
agencies must comply with a variety of other laws. A number of stat-
utes apply to all federal agencies, instructing them, for example, to
take into account environmental impacts or impacts on small
business.92
Of course, the Administrative Procedure Act, as I’ve mentioned, is
a significant constraint on agency action. I have been telling my stu-
dents that they should be carrying the APA around in their pocket
right now because of its importance as a brake on government policy
reversals. The APA is a remarkable statement of American legal prin-
ciples. It establishes an expectation that the government will be ra-
tional, above all, and requires agencies to follow certain procedures to
ensure transparency and accountability.93 The APA creates a pre-
sumption of judicial review of agency action—meaning access to the
courts—and it prescribes what standards of review apply to what
kinds of agency decisions. These standards of review are meant to de-
termine how closely the courts will scrutinize agency action and how
much deference they will apply.
And finally, agencies must also comply with executive orders and
presidential memos. It’s important to recognize that these are not
laws, however. If we analogize to the private sector, they are more
akin to a managerial memo from a CEO instructing his executive of-
ficers about how they should carry out their responsibilities. These
instructions can add burdens to agencies that statutes do not impose,
such as the requirement to do a rigorous cost–benefit analysis on sig-
nificant rules. But if such requirements conflict with statutes passed
by Congress, the statutory requirements prevail. Executive orders and
presidential memoranda do not supersede or preempt either statutes
or the Constitution.
Still, there is significant latitude to change policy within these con-
straints. If an Administration has relied primarily on executive in-
92. See, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 (2012);
Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
121, 110 Stat. 857 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 601–612 (2012)).
93. Jill Nylander, The Administrative Procedure Act, 85 MICH. B.J. 38, 39–40 (2006).
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struments to make policy, a subsequent Administration can reverse
that policy using the same tools. This is an instance of “Live by the
sword; die by the sword.” As I noted, the Obama Administration faced
an intransigent Congress after 2010 and, as prior presidents had
done, turned to executive power to accomplish much of its policy
agenda. In some instances, the agencies have interpreted existing
statutes in creative ways to implement new policies that they believe
are within their statutory mandate but have gone unaddressed. Peo-
ple have widely divergent opinions on the propriety of such interpreta-
tions, which are normally adopted to address new problems not
necessarily foreseen by the enacting Congress.
On the one hand, some people argue that agencies should not
stretch their authority to meet new challenges and should await clear
instruction in new statutes passed by Congress. On the other hand,
since Congress so rarely updates major regulatory statutes, many
agencies are stuck implementing outdated laws and are hamstrung by
them in dealing with the challenges of a modern economy and soci-
ety.94 And there is usually some flexibility in the regulatory authority
Congress delegates because Congress cannot anticipate every possible
situation or use precise enough language to cover every detail of a reg-
ulatory program. Indeed, there is a long tradition of courts deferring
to “reasonable” agency interpretations of their legal mandates. The
question boils down to: When does an interpretation goes too far?95
It is popular to rail against the government and easy to dismiss
people working in the federal agencies as nameless, faceless bureau-
crats, but in my experience, most people working in these agencies are
trying, like all of us, to do their jobs, and often they are operating
under difficult circumstances. Think of independent regulatory agen-
cies like the Federal Communications Commission and the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, or an executive agency like the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency, which are implementing laws that ha-
ven’t been amended for at least forty years and in some cases since the
Depression. And they are trying, in good faith in my experience, to
tackle the economic, public health, social, consumer, and criminal jus-
tice issues that arise in their assigned domains with these old, out-
dated statutes. The Federal Communications Act predates the
Internet.96 The Federal Power Act predates the modern electricity
94. See generally Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163
U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2014) (explaining how agencies are grappling with congressional
failure to pass new laws amidst economic and technological developments).
95. See generally Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 844–63 (1984) (“We
have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive
department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer,
and the principle of deference to administrative interpretations.”).
96. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2012)).
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grid.97 The Clean Air Act anticipated that new pollution problems
would emerge but did not deal squarely or comprehensively with
global warming.98 It is no surprise that the responsible agencies have
been forced to engage in a certain amount of creative adaptation using
the laws that they posses in order to address the modern problems
that we face.
And when Congress is out of the game, as it were—when Congress
does not regularly update statutes to keep up with new economic de-
velopments, new technology, and new science—when the legislative
branch is inert, the Executive Branch is left to use the United States
Code, that is, the laws on the books. It should be no surprise to anyone
that presidents want to achieve their policy agendas, and to do that,
they will use the instruments at their disposal.
What this all boils down to is that presidents can change policy
through agency regulations without congressional approval. And that
is what we see so far with the Trump Administration’s announced reg-
ulatory rollbacks. Congress really has very little to do with it. Now, if
it wants to, the Republican Congress could help the Trump Adminis-
tration. Congress can pass new statutes or amend existing ones if they
wish. But even when you own the House and the Senate, along with
the presidency, it can be challenging to get things done. You see that
in Congress now—Republicans are having difficulty within their own
party trying to repeal and replace the Affordable Care Act,99 or mak-
ing progress on tax reform,100 or getting an infrastructure bill off the
ground.101 And this leaves the President to act unilaterally through
the regulatory process, which means via his executive agencies. What
this means is that President Trump can, if he follows the appropriate
legal procedures, reverse course on the Clean Power Plan, the fuel-
efficiency standards, or the other policies I cited. But this power of
reversal is not absolute.
97. The Federal Power Act was adopted in 1935. See Public Utility Act of 1935 tit. II,
Pub. L. No. 74-333, 49 Stat. 803, 838–63 (1935) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 791a–828c (2012)).
98. See Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963) (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2012)).
99. Juliet Eilperin, Sean Sullivan & Ed O’Keefe, Senate Republicans’ Effort to “Re-
peal and Replace” Obamacare All but Collapses, WASH. POST (July 18, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/trump-suggests-republicans-will-let-
aca-market-collapse-then-rewrite-health-law/2017/07/18/5e79a3ec-6bac-11e7-b9e
2-2056e768a7e5_story.html?utm_term=.43aaebb6ec7f [http://perma.unl.edu/
UE6H-TUS7].
100. Russell Berman, Budget Fight Imperils GOP’s Tax Reform Dreams, ATLANTIC
(Aug. 7, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/08/why-republi-
cans-cant-just-pivot-to-tax-reform/535764 [http://perma.unl.edu/6PRD-KSKS].
101. Republicans, Democrats Bicker over Infrastructure Plans, REUTERS (Jan. 24,
2017), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-congress-infrastructure-idUSKBN
1582G7 [http://perma.unl.edu/C4MW-D6HN].
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I should also say that I do think it is important for agencies to be
able to change their view. You do not want agencies locked indefinitely
into positions, policies, and rules because you do not want a govern-
ment that’s incapable of adjusting to new realities. And, in all fair-
ness, when you win the election, you should be entitled to put your
policy prerogatives into operation. At the same time, there must be
some ballast in the system to prevent arbitrary swings and the insta-
bility that comes with it. This is one of the most profound things about
the American legal system. We have made a commitment in the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act to nonarbitrary government.102 This is an
astonishing thing. Agencies are delegated awesome power, but they
are obligated to justify their decisions, and courts are empowered to
oversee them. And as I said earlier, for both “liberal” and “conserva-
tive” judges, the notion that there are alternative facts based on one’s
ideology is anathema.103 In the legal world, there is no such thing as
alternative facts. There are facts, and there are justifications for poli-
cies that pass the rationality test, and there are justifications that do
not. Judges are not interested in imaginary things. And my prediction
is that even very conservative judges and Justices, even those with
pre-commitments to certain methodologies or philosophies of statu-
tory and constitutional interpretation, are committed to the idea of
rationality. That is the essence of what we teach in law school—that
you are not entitled to simply assert claims without supporting them.
The Administrative Procedure Act embodies this obligation to ration-
ality, and the courts are required to enforce it.
Now I was planning to go over the key cases on the extent to which
agencies can change their minds—I was planning to discuss State
Farm,104 Fox TV,105 Chevron,106 and Brand X.107 These cases show
that agencies can and do change policy but that there are certain lim-
its. For one thing, it’s hard to do an about-face when you must over-
come an elaborate record that supports the initial decision. Courts will
also scrutinize policy shifts closely when there are reliance inter-
ests.108 And there also appear to be powerful constraints on the defer-
ence the Supreme Court is willing to grant to policy shifts that have
unprecedented and broad economic impacts.109 But we do not have
102. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012); see Nicholas Angelocci, KSR v. Teleflex: Obvious Ambigu-
ity, 18 DEPAUL J. ART TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 293 (2008).
103. See Bradner, supra note 72; Ari Melber, Why Trump Lost: Judge Slams Alterna-
tive Facts, MSNBC (Feb. 6, 2017), http://www.msnbc.com/the-last-word/watch/
why-trump-lost-judge-slams-alternative-facts-871464003958.
104. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
105. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009).
106. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
107. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
108. See Krishnakumar, supra note 68, at 1854–56.
109. See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
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time for a long doctrinal discussion. My message to the law students
here is: please take Administrative Law.
I wanted to mention just one more tool being used right now to
reverse policy because knowing something about it will help you to
better understand what is unfolding in the first few months of the new
Administration. Unbeknownst to most people in the country, Congress
and the President are using a very powerful kind of super weapon
called the Congressional Review Act (CRA) to retroactively cancel
rules that are already in place.110 This statute was passed in the
1990s and was used only once before to jettison an unpopular ergo-
nomics rule that was issued at the close of the Clinton Administra-
tion.111 To be honest, none of us ever thought it would amount to
much. In fact, we professors of Administrative Law never used to
teach much about it until now. The CRA allows the House and the
Senate to “disapprove” already final and legally effective rules using a
fast-track procedure that requires only a majority vote with no filibus-
ter potential.112 And that’s why it is so powerful.
The CRA allows Congress to retroactively reach rules that have
been adopted within the prior sixty legislative days.113 How those
days are counted turns out to be complicated, but what matters is that
only congressional working days count, and since Congress is often in
recess, sixty legislative days can turn into something like six months.
So the 115th Congress can reach back to June of the prior year and
disapprove Obama-era rules that were adopted six months ago. Now,
you may say, “Well, that’s not a terrible idea because every Adminis-
tration rushes to the finish line and they adopt a lot of rules that are
sometimes called ‘midnight regulations,’ and they should be looked at
carefully.” The problem is that the CRA is a very blunt instrument
and can have some far-reaching and possibly unintended conse-
quences. If Congress disapproves the rule using the fast-track proce-
dure, and the new President signs the resolution, not only is the
existing rule eliminated, but the CRA dictates that the agency can
never issue a rule that is “substantially the same.”114 And that is an
astonishing thing—to permanently disable an agency from regulating
just because you disapproved of a rule adopted at a particular time.
No one yet knows what this means because no court has ever inter-
preted the relevant provision and defined what substantially the same
means. But I predict that there will be a legal clash over this question
sooner or later because there may well be a statutory mandate requir-
110. 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–808 (2012).
111. Note, The Mysteries of the Congressional Review Act, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2162,
2162 (2009).
112. § 802(d).
113. § 801(d).
114. § 801(b)(2).
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ing regulation, which will lead to a direct conflict with the CRA’s pro-
hibition. When Congress adopted the CRA, it was not clear that its use
could amount to substantively amending regulatory statutes to essen-
tially cancel key provisions.
This Congress has been active in using the CRA: there are now
forty-one resolutions pending to disapprove rules, and two have al-
ready been signed by the Trump Administration, one of which was
withdrawing a rule that took many years to update to prevent coal
companies from dumping mining waste into rivers and streams of the
United States without taking adequate precautions to protect U.S.
waters.115
I mention this because Congress is now sorting through the ap-
proximately 150 regulations that are eligible for disapproval.116 The
biggest constraint on this process now is that under the CRA, each
rule must be disapproved one at a time. But Congress could pass a
new law to allow bundling of rules, and if that happens, Congress
could eliminate dozens of rules in one fell swoop.
The final topic I want to mention is so-called regulatory reform,
which is embodied in bills like the Regulatory Accountability Act
(RAA),117 which, if passed, could dismantle the modern administra-
tive state. Law professors are sometimes prone to hyperbole, but this
statement is not an exaggeration. Bills like the RAA are not mild-
mannered, “good government” reforms that would, say, minimize reg-
ulatory delay and eliminate duplicative rules—something we would
all support. They go much further, and their agenda is much more
cynical. They are designed to slow and impede regulation to such an
extent and to so severely encumber regulatory agencies as to grind
them a standstill. Regulatory reform sounds like such an unobjection-
able goal in the abstract, and it is hard to generate excitement about
it. But the proposals now circulating in Congress are meant to prevent
agencies from performing their essential statutory functions, includ-
ing basic and popular public health, environmental, and consumer
protections, which we all take for granted. Among other things, the
proposals would: add steps to the regulatory process which are unnec-
essary and designed only to cause delay; require duplicative analyses
of cost implications, which are already accounted for in the White
House regulatory review process; attempt to statutorily overturn the
115. Devin Henry, Trump Signs Bill Undoing Obama Coal Mining Rule, HILL (Feb.
16, 2017), http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/319938-trump-signs-bill-
undoing-obama-coal-mining-rule [http://perma.unl.edu/MXG7-ZL3P].
116. See Jason Pye, Congress Moves to Cancel Obama-Era Regulations Under the Con-
gressional Review Act, FREEDOMWORKS (Feb. 3, 2017), http://www.freedomworks
.org/content/congress-moves-cancel-obama-era-regulations-under-congressional-
review-act [http://perma.unl.edu/XW4L-WCL3].
117. Regulatory Accountability Act of 2017, H.R. Res. 5, 115th Cong. (2017) (as passed
by House of Representatives, Jan. 11, 2017).
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Chevron doctrine, which embodies a principle of deference to expert
agencies in the face of ambiguous statutory language; and suspend the
implementation of legally promulgated rules until all litigation is re-
solved (a reversal of current precedent, which presumes regulations
are lawful until a court determines otherwise).
One proposal would require agencies to submit their entire body of
regulations to Congress over a ten-year period (ten percent each year),
after which they would expire if Congress were not to affirmatively
adopt them again by statute.118 These proposals are far from “sexy”
and may not attract much media attention, but they would do signifi-
cant damage if they were adopted in legislation because they would
hobble the ability of the federal government to perform some of its
essential functions.
All of this is to say that while the President is using the tools at his
disposal, Congress is also busy. It will be interesting to monitor this
process as it unfolds—as we move from intention to action. Announc-
ing a regulatory rollback is the easy part; implementing it takes time,
and the substantive policy reversals must survive judicial review.
Likewise, proposing legislation is the easy part; assembling a filibus-
ter-proof majority is much harder. Even the most seemingly discre-
tionary decisions a President can make, like announcing the intent to
withdraw from an executive agreement like the Paris Accord, require
considerable discipline and resolve to effectuate because of the legal
process.
I am not naive about the potential for significant policy shifts to
occur from one Administration and one Congress to the other. But I
think it is worth pointing out the number of structural and legal con-
straints built into the system, which collectively tend to prevent sud-
den and radical changes of direction.
It is true that agencies can change their minds on some matters
without much transparency or process. For example, agencies have a
great deal of discretion to allocate their resources unless Congress has
prescribed how they must do so; and the same is true for enforcement
discretion, which courts normally leave to agency discretion.  Many
agency documents—like informal guidance or policy documents,
which technically are not legally binding but which can have meaning-
ful effects—do not have to go through the notice-and-comment pro-
cess. And political appointees can reassign civil servants, shut career
staff out of key decisions, and politicize agency policymaking. But this
sort of behavior eventually comes to light. It inspires resignations, and
it provokes leaks. Hollowing out an agency, even if an Administration
is determined to do it, takes time and will run into resistance, as we
118. Peter M. Shane, The Quiet GOP Campaign Against Government Regulation, AT-
LANTIC (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/01/gop-
complicates-regulation/514436 [http://perma.unl.edu/K95U-V72F].
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saw during the Reagan Administration at the EPA.119 Career staff in
these agencies can be counted on to resist blatantly illegal or unethical
shenanigans and put up something of a fight if they are asked to do
things that are contrary to agency practice or violate well-established
ethics rules, for example. There are Inspectors General in each of
these agencies too, which are meant to be internal accountability
mechanisms. And there are litigants and stakeholders that are pre-
pared to sue and challenge what they view as unlawful action.
V. CONCLUSION
The story I’m telling you boils down to this: Presidents are entitled
to try to implement their policy prerogatives. That is what happens
when you win an election. But there are genuine legal constraints on
whimsical, irrational, unlawful, and ill-thought-out reversals of policy.
This is true no matter which party you favor. I am trying to give some
comfort to those who are concerned about the direction of federal pol-
icy at the moment, while also acknowledging—for those who are en-
thusiastic about it—that there is room to change a prior
Administration’s policies, provided it is done lawfully.
I suppose this talk is really a paean to the rule of law as a con-
straint on raw politics and a reminder of the value of understanding
how law works so that you can participate in the democratic process.
It is also a reminder to look beyond initial announcements, tweets,
and press releases, because very few presidential decisions are self-
executing, and the real action happens in the legal trenches.
VI. QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION
A. Question 1—Failure to Comply with Paris Accord
Question. If the United States does not withdraw from the Paris
Agreement officially but then effectively stops doing what is necessary
to adhere to it, what are the international legal obligations or reper-
cussions? What could potentially be the fallback?
Answer. That is a great question, and there are so many things to
say in response. Let me try to be brief. The most practical thing to say
is this is not a binding legal agreement.120 There’s actually no “pun-
ishment” or sanction in the sense we think about it as lawyers. There’s
no penalty other than suffering the opprobrium of the rest of the
world. The Paris Accord is fundamentally and intentionally different
in design from its predecessor, the Kyoto Protocol, the 1992 treaty
119. See Philip Shabecoff, Reagan and Environment: To Many, a Stalemate, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 2, 1989), http://www.nytimes.com/1989/01/02/us/reagan-and-environ-
ment-to-many-a-stalemate.html?pagewanted=all.
120. Daniel Bodansky, The Role of the International Court of Justice in Addressing
Climate Change: Some Preliminary Reflections, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 689, 696 (2016).
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that required the developed countries to cut their emissions by an av-
erage of something like five percent, while not requiring any binding
cuts from the developing world.121
The Paris Accord is voluntary, and there is no differential treat-
ment between the developed and developing world.122 All of the
world’s major economies have pledged to take some action, whether to
cut their emissions by a certain percentage compared to baseline
levels, reduce the carbon intensity of their economies, or commit to a
certain percentage of electricity from renewables, or any combination
of measures.123 It’s a bottom-up agreement and was designed inten-
tionally to allow countries to make a pledge based on what they can
accomplish domestically, which presumably makes it politically feasi-
ble for them to actually achieve the things they have promised. The
key to the Agreement, which has not been fully elaborated yet, is mon-
itoring and verifying what each country has done to hold them ac-
countable for their pledges.
The price of failing to deliver on our own pledge is shame and em-
barrassment that the richest and most powerful country in the world
can’t seem to do what it says it will do, the loss of our moral leadership
on an issue of global importance, and some chafing with allies with
whom we must negotiate on other matters. China is the big winner if
we fall short of our pledge, and especially if we formally withdraw
from the Paris Accord.124 The Chinese leadership must be gleeful at
the prospect of saying, “We’re the global leader on climate change.”
This would be a huge gift from President Trump to President Xi. I
think that is the real cost.
In the short term, I do not think anything Trump does will unravel
the Agreement. The rest of the world has already, if you will, internal-
ized this into the share price. By that I mean that other countries have
already figured out that what they’re going to get out of the United
States for the next four, and perhaps eight, years is, at best, benign
neglect. They may even be hoping for benign neglect, because at least
they can live to fight another day. It would be worse if the United
States were to go further and try to undermine what other countries
121. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 61.
122. Brad Plumer, Stay in or Leave the Paris Climate Deal? Lessons from Kyoto, N.Y.
TIMES, May 10, 2017, at A17, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/09/climate/paris-
climate-agreement-kyoto-protocol.html.
123. See id.
124. See generally Matthew Pennington, Trump’s Exit from Paris Agreement Could
Open Door for China to Lead on Climate Change, PBS (June 1, 2017), http://www
.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/trumps-exit-paris-agreement-open-door-china-lead-
climate-change [http://perma.unl.edu/URP5-BXSC] (“Trump’s announcement
that the U.S. would leave the Paris accord immediately sparked international
criticism, deepening perceptions of an America in retreat after recent reversals
on free trade and foreign aid. China may be poised to fill the breach.”).
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are trying to do to comply. But it is early yet, and we will have to wait
and see.
B. Question 2—Informal Agency Rulemaking
Question. You’ve talked a bit about how the President and the Ex-
ecutive Branch can work on changing policy through regulatory
rulemaking and how that process takes time, but I’m interested in the
way in which the President and the Executive Branch can actually
make changes in, not necessarily law, but the rules that affect every-
day people through memoranda, through the President directing de-
partment heads and agency heads to issue policy guidance, that sort of
thing. And bypassing the regulatory notice-and-comment process
altogether.
Answer. This is a great “in-the-weeds” question that I wanted to
get to in the course of talking a little bit about the instruments presi-
dents can use. But the basic answer is yes, there are things agencies
do to make policy through informal advisories and “guidance docu-
ments” that in theory do not make new law but just interpret existing
law and regulations, and these do not require an elaborate process.125
So there are other tools and mechanisms for announcing policy deci-
sions that are far less formal than so-called legislative rules, more hid-
den, and more flexible. There are fewer constraints on these tools, but
the price of using them is that courts give them less deference.
C. Question 3—The Kyoto Protocol
Question. The Kyoto Agreement—that was a lot of benign neglect,
wasn’t it?
Answer. Yes, in a way. Of course we never ratified it,126 so that’s
more than benign neglect. President Clinton never submitted the Ky-
oto Protocol to the Senate because he knew the votes weren’t there.127
And the big complaint about the Kyoto Protocol was the bifurcation in
treatment of the developed and developing world. The U.S. Senate
passed a resolution saying that they disapproved of that structure be-
cause, although we are the world’s largest emitter historically, we
were about to be overtaken by China, which has now happened.128
And that is why the Obama team worked so hard to design a different
125. See Anthony, supra note 67, at 5.
126. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 61.
127. See Christie Aschwanden, A Lesson from Kyoto’s Failure: Don’t Let Congress
Touch a Climate Deal, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Dec. 4, 2015), https://fivethirtyeight
.com/features/a-lesson-from-kyotos-failure-dont-let-congress-touch-a-climate-deal
[http://perma.unl.edu/HH7V-U4L3].
128. Id.
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structure that could bring China, India, and the other major emerging
economies into the fold.129
D. Question 4—Chevron Deference
Question. I want to talk a little bit about, or hear your thoughts
more about, checks and balances. So, from the standpoint of someone
who applauds a lot of the Obamas Administration’s environmental ad-
vancements, not only in air but also in water and other things, toxics
and the like, it seems to me that for those in that camp hoping to con-
tinue some progressive engagement in greenhouse-gas emissions and
that kind of thing, the best we can hope for right now is benign neglect
from Congress—that phrase has been used a little bit earlier—and
strict judicial review from the judiciary. So, what are your thoughts on
Chevron? How do all these things fit together?
Answer. I’m not sure I can fully answer that last part, but let me
start with Chevron. The legal principle established by the famous case
called Chevron is that when a law is ambiguous, an agency gets the
first crack at interpreting it.130 This approach is based on the theory
that when Congress delegates a law to the agency—entrusts it to the
agency for implementation—Congress expects the agency to fill in the
gaps and the ambiguities.131 Now it’s hard to test that theory empiri-
cally, and it may be a legal fiction, but it has served as the justification
for the principle that the agency ought to have the authority to con-
strue ambiguous provisions, providing those interpretations are
within a zone of reasonableness. Agencies don’t have to get the right
answer, but they need to come up with a reasonable one. Expertise is
another justification for Chevron deference: that the agencies are best
positioned to fill in the gaps or silences in a statute because they are
the subject-matter experts and they have a lot of experience imple-
menting the law over time.132 So if a judgment call has to be made, it
is better for the agency rather than the courts to make it. That’s the
democratic-accountability theory of the Chevron decision.
The way Chevron works is that if the court reads the law and says
it’s clear—that is, if Congress has spoken to the issue and it’s discern-
able from the text of the law—the court says, “I don’t care what the
agency thinks. The statute is clear.” But when the law is ambiguous
and the court is willing to admit as much, they will defer to the agency
as long as the agency is judged to be within the bounds of reasonable-
ness. One way to sum up the idea of Chevron is that the “tie goes to
129. Plumer, supra note 122.
130. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 865.
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the runner,” meaning, in the case of ambiguity, the expert agency gets
the benefit of the doubt.
What tends to happen, however, is that one’s feelings about Chev-
ron change depending on whether one’s team is in or out of power. You
don’t like deference to the Executive Branch when you do not own it.
But when you do own it, you are Chevron’s biggest fan! By the way,
that is why I find it curious that the regulatory-reform bills that I
talked about include this provision trying to jettison Chevron defer-
ence.  Right now, the Republicans should want that deference since it
is Trump’s Executive Branch. But these reform bills have been hang-
ing around a long time and appear to have been pretty haphazardly
combined into a package full of blunt instruments. I wonder if the Re-
publican members sponsoring them have really thought this through.
E. Question 5—Separation of Powers
Question. This is kind of a follow up to that. I’d like to comment
about the intersection of what you just said with separation of powers.
How does the separation of powers intersect with rulemaking? On the
legislative level in Nebraska, we often see legislation that I think is
aimed to give the legislature a second bite at the apple in reviewing
rules and regulations once they’ve already passed a law that requires
an agency to do rules and regulations. And they keep building in more
steps—I don’t know—legislative overview of the rules and regula-
tions. Maybe this is a particular problem in Nebraska. But it has the
effect of, the people who lost in the debate of the law that passed, they
come and they hound you on the rulemaking process.
Answer. I’ve learned that you are unique here in Nebraska with
the unicameral legislature, which I admit I don’t fully understand. I’m
not sure about the extent to which that feature of  your state govern-
ment informs your question. But I guess what I would say is, the sepa-
ration of powers at the federal level is foundational to everything I
have said. In other words, Congress is the lawmaking body. Congress
passes the statutes and then delegates them to the agencies. But the
U.S. Constitution requires bicameralism and presentment to the Pres-
ident to pass legislation. Congress can’t retain control over implemen-
tation through mechanisms like a one-house or one-committee
legislative veto—a tool that Congress used for a long time until the
Supreme Court declared it unconstitutional.133 In other words, once
Congress has delegated the statute, that is, handed it off for imple-
mentation, members don’t get another bite at the apple on the cheap.
Congress is free to amend any statute or repeal any statute, appropri-
ate money, or cut appropriations, but if it wants to substantively
amend a statute, it must follow the proper procedure. The fact is the
133. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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agencies are legally obligated to implement a statute unless and until
Congress amends it.
Of course, Congress is hardly powerless. Members can hold hear-
ings and embarrass agency officials, and require them to spend signif-
icant time and resources defending themselves both in hearings and
in the press. They can hound career staff, send letters to them con-
stantly, and launch investigations. They can threaten to cut their
budgets too. And I’m sure there are similar accountability mecha-
nisms at the state level in Nebraska.
